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Particularistic and System Trust in Family Businesses: The Role of Family Influence 
 
Abstract 
Research on how trust develops and why it matters in family businesses is in development. Our study 
investigates the emergence and evolution of trust in family business leaders. Drawing on the New 
Systems Theory, we also examine the impact of family influence on trust. Multiple semi-structured 
interviews were performed in three Chinese family businesses. Results suggest that relationship-based 
particularistic trust prevails at the start-up stage because of the void of governance mechanisms. As 
businesses grow, particularistic trust gradually gives way to institution-based system trust. Evidence 
further indicates high family influence catalyses particularistic trust initially and restricts system trust 
subsequently.  
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Introduction  
The business environment has become increasingly competitive. In this relentlessly competitive 
environment, family businesses have to continuously adjust their strategies, balance their idiosyncratic 
family and business needs, and align their operations with the changing environment to tackle intense 
competition (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, and Wright 2015). 
Leaders who are able to garner trust from their subordinates, regardless of the changing environment, 
may lead their businesses toward success. In contrast, when leaders are incompetent in gathering trust, 
cohesiveness of the firm deteriorates (Sundaramurthy 2008), and the owning family loses its control 
(Davis, Allen, and Hayes 2010). 
The importance of trust in leader has been recognised for more than five decades (Argyris 
1962). The value of trust in leader, its antecedents as well as the behaviour and performance outcomes 
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have been examined in the disciplines of organisational psychology, public administration, leadership, 
and others (Dirks and Ferrin 2002; Burke, Sims, Lazzara, and Salas 2007). Since the late 1990s, trust 
has even turned into a theme of research on its own (Dirks and Ferrin 2002). Nevertheless, irrespective 
of the considerable development, trust has yet been integrated into the mainstream family business 
research (Eddleston, Chrisman, Steier, and Chua 2010). In fact, research on trust has not been 
adequately implemented in the family business context.  
Researchers argue that family businesses differ from their non-family counterparts because of 
the intermingling family and business systems (Sirmon and Hitt 2003; Habbershon, Williams, and 
MacMillan 2003), where both business ownership and management are helmed by the same family 
(González-Cruz and Cruz-Ros 2016). This determines that family businesses often rely on a form of 
governance that is family-influenced (Allen, George, and Davis 2018) and communication-based.  In 
this context trust, which is communicatively constructed (Frank, Kessler, Rush, Suess-Reyes, and 
Weismeier-Sammer 2017), often plays an important role (Sundaramurthy 2008; Shi, Shepherd, and 
Schmidts 2015; Wang 2016a) and functions as a “lubricant” (Allen et al., 2018) facilitating 
relationships among family and non-family employees. In fact, family businesses often possess trust-
related advantages (Steier 2001) such as employees’ identification with the business, loyalty, and 
willingness to sacrifice personal interests (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Davis et al. 2010; 
De Massis, Frattini, Pizzurno, and Cassia 2015). These are the attributes that non-family businesses 
seek constantly and have to invest significant resources to achieve. Nevertheless, how is trust and in 
particular trust in leader constructed in the family business environment? How does trust in leader 
evolve as the business develops? How does family influence affect trust in the evolution process, since 
the family represents a distinctive part in this business setting? In the limited studies on trust in family 
businesses, Sundaramurthy (2008) made an attempt to answer the first two questions in her conceptual 
paper. Viewing trust as a dynamic concept, she argued that at the initial stage a high level of 
relationship-based trust often exists. As the business grows, other types of trust such as competence 
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trust and system trust emerge. While acknowledging that Sundaramurthy’s study explains the initiation 
and evolution of trust in family businesses, we recognise that how family influence affects trust in the 
business evolution process is unaddressed. This then becomes the focal point of our paper. Also, in our 
paper we attempt to empirically examine Sundaramurthy’s conclusion.    
The current paper investigates how trust in leader in family businesses emerges and evolves and 
how family influence affects trust in this process. By relying on a qualitative approach, we contribute to 
the understanding of trust in leader in family businesses in the following important ways. Firstly, the 
study focuses on the impact of family influence on trust in leader, which has yet to be examined in the 
family business context. The new systems theory (nST) is adopted as the underpinning theoretical 
framework (Luhmann 1995, 2013). We examine the impact of family influence on trust via decision 
premises. Our findings offer a new understanding to the literature by showing the nexus between 
family influence and trust, and specifically the circumstances under which family influence enables 
trust construction. Secondly, the study explains why, how, and under what circumstances trust in leader 
evolves with business development. This result is important, in that most prior studies adopt a static 
perspective, which may be time-sensitive, context-specific, and bias-ridden. We adopt a dynamic 
viewpoint (Sundaramurthy 2008) that is conducive to understanding the evolution of trust and the role 
of family. Finally, this study investigates trust in leader in Chinese family businesses, which leads to 
more in-depth understanding of China’s private sector and its effects on an array of aspects relevant to 
family business management, including entrepreneurial venturing, social networking, and business 
sustainability.  
The remainder of this paper includes four sections. In the theoretical background section, the 
literature in relation to trust in leader, particularistic trust and system trust is reviewed. The subsequent 
research methodology section defines the methodological approach this study adopts and the data 
collection and analysis procedure. Research results are then presented. This is followed by the 
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discussion and conclusion, including the summary of contributions, implications of this study, and 
directions for future research.  
 
Theoretical Background  
New Systems Theory   
The nST as a theoretical framework recently has been applied to family business research (Von 
Schlippe and Frank 2013; Frank et al. 2017; Hasenzagl, Hatak, and Frank 2018). The nST was initiated 
by Luhmann (1995, 2013), who argued that a society consists of many separated social systems and 
each social system is built upon countless meaningful communication. Communication continuously 
reproduces itself and through continuous juxtapositions of communication, a social system is 
developed (Mattheis 2012; Frank et al. 2017). While communication forms the core of the theory 
(Luhmann 1995), the nST emphasises the processes or mechanisms of communication, instead of 
individual players involved in communication (Von Schlippe and Frank 2013). Thus, the nST can 
reduce the complexity in understanding a social system, because understanding the rules of the game is 
often easier than appreciating individuals and their interactions in the system (Frank et al. 2017).     
Organisations are social systems. In particular, a family business is a social system that has two 
interactive components, namely the family and the business (Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua 1996).  
Luhmann (2013) indicated that organisations are “systems made up of decisions, and capable of 
completing decision[s] that make them up, through decisions that make them up” (p.32). That is, 
organisations make decisions based on former decisions, or alternatively, decisions are autopoietic and 
self-referential. Seidl (2004) pointed out that those decisions that are crucial to organisational 
operations are often connected and they further become preconditions for a set of future decisions. 
Simon (1957) introduced an important concept of decision premise, which frames the decision-making 
process. Decision premises take time to be built up; nevertheless, once established, they constitute a 
basal and enduring structure for decision-making in organisations (Suess-Reyes 2017). From the nST 
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point of view, a family business can be defined as “a communication system incorporating the decision 
premises shaped by a family” (Frank et al. 2017, p.712). Similarly, a business family can be defined as 
“a communication system of a self-defined group of the family that is involved in business-related 
communication and capable of influencing the decision premises in the business” (Suess-Reyes 2017, 
p.753).    
In fact, a number of theoretical frameworks have been taken into account as the theoretical 
underpinning of the current study, for instance the network theory. Via the lens of the network theory, a 
family business may be viewed as a bundle of networks and the analysis will focus on how each 
individual interacts with others in the networks. In the current study’s context the nST is more 
appropriate, since it views organisations as communication-based social systems and centres on what 
mechanisms enable the business family to influence the family business and what forms the basis for 
trust in leader.  
 
Family Influence via Decision Premises   
Since the notion was introduced, researchers have employed an array of terms to describe the essence 
of family influence, including familiness, family capital, family involvement and family control 
(Habbershon and Williams 1999; Chrisman, Chua and Steier 2005; Hoffman, Hoelscher, and Sorenson 
2006; Carnes and Ireland 2013), yet hitherto there is no agreement on what family influence is. When 
operationalising this notion, a common approach is to evaluate the extent of ownership, management, 
and control. Frank et al. (2017) argued that family influence in the business “in terms of ownership, 
management, or control does not necessarily mean that the family exercises its potential influence on 
the business” (p.715). Families may have their notional influence only on the paperwork, and never 
genuinely influence business behaviour. Frank et al. (2017) suggested that researchers focus on “the 
actual family influence via the decision premises the family implements in the business” (p.715) to 
understand how unconventional family-induced behaviour occurs. In this paper, when family influence 
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is concerned, we take into account the influence from the entire business family, including the owner-
manager. 
Simon (1957) argued that organisations choose decision premises in their own business context. 
They decide which decision premises they should concentrate on and how much effort they should 
engage in via the decision premises. The business family is able to “imprint family-specific decision 
premises” (Frank et al. 2017, p.713) into the firm’s communication system. Via these premises, the 
business family expresses its interests and then reflects them in the firm’s communication as well as 
operations. In their study, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) offered a four-C framework, which 
implies family influences business via four inter-related decision premises, namely continuity, 
command, community, and connection. In particular, continuity means that decision-oriented 
communication within family businesses is recursively associated with business continuity. Trans-
generational succession and business longevity are perennial communication topics in family 
businesses. Moreover, compared to less family-influenced firms, highly family-influenced businesses 
are more interested in sustaining business ownership and wealth within the business family (Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller, and Lester 2010). Command infers that autopoietic and self-referential communication 
within family businesses is often related to authority. Family business executives are powerful 
individuals and they often “behave in an unorthodox way” (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005, p.525), 
given their ownership of the business and responsibility for the family. Communication in family 
businesses often reflects these executives’ authority. In addition, compared to those in less family-
influenced firms, executive leaders in highly family-influenced businesses are likely to keep a higher 
level of autonomy and are more independent from other stakeholders (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 
2005; Konig, Kammerlander, and Enders 2013). Community means that autopoietic and self-referential 
decision-oriented communication is often about the entity that employers intend to establish within their 
businesses. Employers of family businesses often intend to create a “pseudo-family” (Tan and Fock 
2001, p.128), which embraces employees and encourages their commitment. Specifically, executive 
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leaders in highly family-influenced businesses are often selective and choose to socialise with a small 
number of staff members (that is, the more family influence on the business, the narrower its 
community becomes), as they wish “their personal values and ethics are deeply embedded in their 
company” (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005, p.521) so that the business can be directed by the 
business family. Finally, connection suggests that decision-oriented communication within family 
businesses is often about building up social networks. In particular, highly family-influenced firms 
usually build up social capital and enduring alliances with a small number of stakeholders (that is, the 
more family influence on the business, the narrower the connection becomes), through which they 
construct their identities and status in the society (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005). Frank et al. 
(2017) stated that decision premises in family businesses often demonstrate two features: a) they 
“regulate the influence of the family and institutionalise it”, and b) “reduce complexity …and simplify 
decision process” (p.714). We argue that the four Cs exhibit the features of decision premises. 
Continuity, command, community, and connection are communicatively constructed in family 
businesses and are able to institutionalise family influence. They portray the inherent characteristics of 
family influence and holistically outline the family-induced nature. They can also be perceived as the 
“rules of the game” in decision-making, simplifying the decision-making process. The four-C premises 
take time to construct (Suess-Reyes 2017), but once established, no matter whether the family is 
directly involved in the decision-making process, it will influence the decision (Frank et al. 2017) via 
these premises.  
 
Concept of Trust and Levels of Trust  
Family businesses distinguish themselves from their non-family counterparts in that both business 
ownership and management are held by one family (Chrisman, Chua, and Litz 2004; Allen et al. 2018). 
As a result, family business governance is often family-influenced and communication-based. Trust 
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plays an important role in this context, which can catalyse interactions between leaders and employees. 
When trust is absent, employees are less likely to engage in constructive behaviour (Allen et al. 2018).  
In this study, we examine the trust of employees, including both family and non-family 
employees, in their leaders. In particular, we choose the owner-manager as our referent of trust. Dirks 
and Ferrin (2002) found that most studies investigating trust in leader focus on one of the two referents: 
the direct leader (e.g., supervisor) or the executive leader. The roles of the two leaders differ (Bass 
1990). While the direct leader often offers operational supervision, the executive leader acts more 
strategically. Trust in the direct leader often leads to an employee improving job performance. In 
contrast, trust in the executive leader often results in an individual’s higher organisational commitment 
and psychological affiliation (cf., Dirks and Ferrin 2002). In this study, our referent of trust is the 
executive leader. In the small-sized family business context, executive leadership is often taken by the 
owner-manager. Thus, trust in leader in our study means trust of employees, including both family and 
non-family employees, in the owner-manager(s).  
Trust is a multi-level concept in management research (Sundaramurthy 2008). Researchers 
recognise that trust exists at the interpersonal level (between different individuals), organisational level 
(between employees and their organisation), inter-organisational level (between organisations), and 
society level (between individuals in a society) (Burke et al. 2007; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 
1998). In the current study, we position trust at both interpersonal and organisational levels. During an 
initial business stage, trust in leader is more likely to occur at the interpersonal level (Sundaramurthy 
2008), which stems from particularistic ties between the employees and the leader (Luhmann 1979; 
Tan, Yang, and Veliyath 2009). This trust is relationship-based. When owner-managers continuously 
communicate and interact with their subordinates, their capability or integrity may evoke the 
employees’ confidence and positive perceptions. Mishra and Spreitzer (1998) in a study of the role of 
trust in a change process outline four key dimensions of a change agent’s trustworthiness, namely 
competence, reliability, openness, and caring the interests of stakeholders (cf., Croonen 2010). We 
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borrow the four dimensions, and argue that from the nST perspective these four dimensions represent 
the decision premises to relationship-based trust. In family businesses, recursive communication about 
leaders’ competence, reliability, openness, and caring nature occurs. When such communication is 
generally positive, employees are inclined to trust their leader. The second level of trust is at the 
organisational level, which often occurs at the business mature stage. Family businesses at this time 
often demand a higher level of operational consistency and reliability. The foci of communication 
therefore shift away from the attributes of leaders to the nature of policies and procedures. In this 
context, an executive leader who is able to develop enabling policies and procedures often harvests 
trust. Herein transparency and fairness of procedures and policies are crucial (Sundaramurthy 2008). 
From the nST perspective, transparency and fairness represent the decision premises, and 
communication at the mature stage is often about transparency and fairness. When such communication 
is optimistic, employees’ institution-based system trust will be evoked (Tan et al. 2009). Here, 
transparency means that rules and procedures in a family business are open and explicit to employees. 
This is not easy given the accentuated family interest in business control and the sensitivity of family-
influenced governance (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2005). Fairness on the other hand requires leaders 
to consider their subordinates’ diversified interests and design policies and procedures that treat each 
individual equally (Whitener 1997; Heyden, Blondel, and Carlock 2005).  
 
Family Influence, Particularistic Trust, and System Trust    
During the early stage of family businesses, trust in leader is often derived from interactions between a 
leader and his/her subordinates (Sundaramurthy 2008), while family influence via the decision 
premises may catalyse this relationship-based trust. For instance, family influence via the continuity 
premise means that decision-related communication within family businesses is often about business 
continuity. This drives businesses to concentrate on developing commercially acceptable products 
initially and creating customer bases. Leaders therefore are impelled to actively show their competence 
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in acquiring resources as well as accesses to tacit knowledge. Employees on the other hand are 
encouraged to interact with their leaders and share experience and expertise. Such interactions are 
conducive to relationship construction, enabling each individual “to ‘feel’ as well as to ‘think’ like the 
other” (Lewicki and Bunker 1996, p.122). Moreover, the communicatively constructed continuity 
concern may prompt leaders to be open to their subordinates and look after their needs. In such family 
businesses, employees are willing to contribute for the good of the business, “even to the point of self-
sacrifice” (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg 1997, p.3). They are psychologically connected to 
their leaders. Particularistic trust therefore stems from this close relationship, as a result of leaders’ 
attributes (i.e., decision premises from the nST point of view).   
When it grows, a family business demands a higher level of operational reliability and 
efficiency, which invites systematic regulatory inputs. Relationship-based particularistic trust thus 
gradually loses its grounding, and gives way to institution-based system trust as the means that governs 
interpersonal exchanges (Sydow 1998; Sundaramurthy 2008). System trust, by nature, relies on 
transparency and fairness of policies and procedures (Luhmann 1979; Sundaramurthy 2008). In those 
family firms when continuity is communicated, executive leaders usually encourage family members 
to join the firms, or even take senior positions irrespective of their competency. This recruitment, 
though seeming to have addressed the continuity concern, barely shows any transparency or fairness. 
Thus, communication on transparency and fairness of policies is likely to be negative, which constrains 
the development of system trust. In fact, setting up transparent and fair policies in such family 
businesses is often difficult, since stakeholders are psychologically ambivalent toward policy 
construction. Owner-managers may encounter psychological deterrents to policy development as it 
implies relinquishing personal autonomy. Family members worry about loss of family harmony and 
potential conflicts (Lansberg 1999). Non-family managers, who have served the firm for long, may be 
reluctant to switch from relationship-based to policy-based management (Lansberg 1999).  
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The above sections illustrate the theoretical framework, introduce the concept of trust and levels 
of trust, and review the literature on the relationship between family influence, particularistic trust, and 
system trust. The next section describes the research design and the methodology adopted to develop 
insights into how trust in leader emerges and evolves in family businesses, as well as the role of family 
influence.     
 
Research Design and Method  
Existing family business research tends to prefer a positivist paradigm and incorporate hypothesis 
testing based on a quantitative approach (De Massis, Sharma, Chua, and Chrisman 2012). Nevertheless, 
as discussed earlier, knowledge about the evolution of trust and the impact of family influence on trust 
in leader is scarce. The absence of conclusive data pushed us to employ alternative research methods 
(Kontinen and Ojala 2011; Dalpiaz, Tracey, and Phillips 2014). In this study, we embrace a post-
positivist ontological position because of its emphasis on investigating and identifying “relationships 
and non-relationships, respectively, between what we experience, what actually happens, and the 
underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world” (Danermark, Ekstron, Jakobsen, and 
Karlsson 2002, p. 21). We adopt a qualitative strategy by using multiple case studies (Yin 2009) to 
enable “quality, depth and richness in the findings” (Marshal and Rossman 1999, p. 16) and understand 
these findings in an authentic context. This strategy also allows us to collect both subjective and 
objective data to develop rigorous and robust insights into the phenomenon (Reay and Whetten 2011). 
The inductive approach further leads to a conceptual typology of family influence on trust in family 
business leaders via decision premises, which is a major outcome of the study. 
The study was conducted in China. The Chinese economy still has a great level of complexity 
with co-existing state-owned, collective-owned, private-owned, and other types of enterprises (Wang 
2016b), even after almost four decades of economic reforms. Classified as private firms, family 
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businesses receive a low level of legal and institutional protection due to ideological concerns (Tan 
2002), thus trust and relational capital play an idiosyncratic role in business operations. On the other 
hand, the transition that China is undergoing offers opportunities to family businesses (Jiang, Gong, 
Wang, and Kimble 2016), as reforms in policies, regulations, and legal frameworks encourage 
entrepreneurial venturing. Investigations in such a transitional environment are interesting, and in 
particular scrutiny of the emergence and evolution of trust in family businesses.  
Though the development of an accurate family business definition is still on-going, researchers 
generally agree that family businesses refer to those where a family has a substantial impact on 
business management (De Massis et al. 2015). In this study we defined a family business as a business 
shaped by a family with family members playing an active role in its decision-making and operations 
(Frank et al. 2017). Moreover, we decided to incorporate small- and medium-sized enterprisesi in our 
study. By focusing on companies of a similar size, we avoided the risk of confusing heterogeneity as a 
result of difference in company size (De Massis et al. 2015). We further sought to obtain a balanced 
sample combining homogeneity and heterogeneity (cf., Merriam 1988). On the one hand, we selected 
case companies in two diverse regions in China, namely the eastern coastal province of Jiangsu, which 
was a first-mover in the rise of China’s private economy with well-developed market infrastructure, 
and the western inland autonomous region of Xinjiang, which was a typical late-comer in China’s 
economic development but arguably rich in nascent opportunities for new and entrepreneurial activities. 
On the other hand, all case companies engaged in similar business activities, namely, vehicle parts 
manufacturing, sales and services. By doing this, we took into consideration not only data availability 
and accessibility but also cross-case comparability.  
Studying the evolution of trust in leader required the case company to be in operation for 
sufficient time as for the evolution to occur and to be captured. Yet, China’s private economy only 
commenced to emerge after 1979, hence, a lack of available and accessible businesses potentially 
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eligible for the study, particularly in the less developed region of Xinjiang. As our interviews continued, 
however, repetition of information emerged and increased, until such repetition became dominant and 
subsequent emergence of new themes became significantly unlikely (Creswell 1994). This signalled the 
information saturation (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). As a result, the study entailed three cases (see 
Table 1).   
Insert Table 1 here 
We used semi-structured interviews where open-ended questions were asked around the key 
constructs as defined earlier, which ensured an uninterrupted emphasis on family influence and trust in 
leader, and allowed interviewees to bring in their own themes and evidence relevant to the study. For 
example, to understand family influence via the command premise, we asked the interviewees to 
describe the “standard” way in which instructions and directives were given and received. While most 
interviewees explained the line of reporting and their position in the line, there were comments on its 
historical changes as well as the “feeling” about its effectiveness. These were the moments when 
further discussions were held to explore “how” and “why” (Yin 2009). 
To ensure validity of data (Eisenhardt 1989), multiple interviews were conducted for each case 
company, involving the owner-managers, founders, employees from management and non-
management positions, family members and relatives who were involved in the business (see Table 2). 
Eventually having four to five interviews per case helped us reduce dependence on any one individual, 
and having the same information gathered from multiple sources helped verify its authenticity. Each 
interview commenced with a brief introduction explaining the purpose, process and implications of the 
research. The emphasis then moved on to the family’s influence in the business and the interactions 
between the executive leaders and their followers. The purpose was to identify the origin, evolution, 
and outcome of trust in leader. 
To supplement the insights emerged from interviews, we also utilised personal observations on 
site during fieldwork. Though few systematic data was produced directly from these observations, they 
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somehow provided extra evidence for our understanding of the phenomena under question. Specifically, 
the factory layout gave an impression of how people were related at workplace; employees’ actions and 
tones that we saw and heard during our site visits also helped us understand communication 
relationships at the case companies. For example, we noticed that at the main entrance of ED, there was 
a banner reading “Welcome to ED, your home away from home”, which indicated that the company 
tried to nurture a family-like atmosphere at work that could be related to the family influence on its 
community premise. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Consistent with the inductive methodology of the study, we took an interpretative approach in 
data analysis, mainly because of the qualitative nature of the study in general, and the descriptive 
nature of the data in particular (Creswell 1994). Interview recordings were transcribed in Chinese 
verbatim, and coded for each case for information related to the main constructs (i.e., decision premises, 
particularistic trust, system trust) and the evolution of them (i.e., initial stage, mature stage). We 
conducted keyword searching and repeated reading to capture meaning repetitions, which enabled a 
clustering analysis that grouped together similar meanings in order to yield common themes. The 
purpose of this approach was also to minimise irrelevant information in the wealth of the collected 
information and control the possible variance (Wang, Huang, and Tan 2013). Given that the Chinese 
language is highly contextual, we processed analysis in Chinese in order to retain the true meanings as 
much as possible, and to avoid the risk of losing them in translation. The coded themes and relevant 
quotes were then translated into English by both authors independently and then compared to ensure 
the accuracy. The back translation technique (Harkness 2003) was also used to guarantee the accuracy 
and credibility of the data translation.  
 
Findings   
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In this section, the findings from the case studies are presented. We concentrate on the four decision 
premises of family influence, and analyse the impact of each on trust in leader. By portraying a picture 
of trust in leader in family businesses, we endeavour to make contributions to the family business 
research at the intersection of family influence and trust.  
 
Case Study of EM 
Family Influence and Particularistic Trust  
The business family of EM was deeply devoted to the start-up, due to the family’s influence over the 
continuity premise, and provided key resources at its initial stage, in various forms. For example, the 
founding of EM was fully financed from personal savings of the founder, who resigned from his 
position in the local government for his own business. The founder’s wife also quitted her job in an 
SOE (state-owned enterprise) to be in full-time charge of the start-up’s external networking. EM’s 
employees were all local residents and many were distant relatives of the founder. In this context, 
particularistic trust was arguably made out of the competence of the leader in organising resources 
necessary for the business, as well as the common identity, shared by the leader and employees. 
 The business family of EM had a strong influence on the business via the command premise, 
especially at the founding stage. For instance, the founder once fired a distant relative who repeatedly 
made mistakes. This incident left the founder with an image of power and might, which was welcomed 
by the employees. As the office administrator recalled, “He was sharp and firm with the bottom lines… 
we thought he was a fair and trustworthy boss.” 
 Family influence via the community premise was also explicit at EM. From the start-up, EM 
kept a core management team that included only the owning family members. This ongoing practice 
helped the business to achieve a high level of consistency in decision-making, hence the leader’s 
reliability was established. This was reflected by the office administrator, who revealed, “We are all 
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part of the village, and they [the business family] know us well… we [employees] don’t have to worry 
about decisions, since they certainly know what they are doing.” 
 With regard to the connection premise, EM initially relied on the founder’s personal networks 
in the local government. For example, EM was able to access first-hand information about the 
government’s regulation updates with more clarity through the founder’s former classmates who 
worked in the local government. Personal connections also facilitated the business to participate in 
major regional trade fairs and hence secure market access. Employees as a result were assured that the 
business was secure and stable because of the founder’s competence. 
 
Family Influence and System Trust 
After the inception of EM, it took nearly ten years before its business gradually moved into the mature 
stage. In 2008, the founder passed on the baton to the second generation, though the company still 
engaged with the same range of products as in the founding generation. EM’s succession approach was 
gradual and smooth, in which the founder mentored and assisted his son for nearly ten years before 
succession. At the mature stage, even after succession, the business family of EM still placed explicit 
emphasis on family ownership and its continuity. The business model did not change, and key 
positions were either taken by family members or long-serving employees from the founding 
generation. Our interviews and observations suggested that personal relationship-based particularistic 
trust still prevailed. 
 Family influence via the command premise was strong at EM, even after succession. The 
retired founder remained “advisor” and was frequently consulted for strategic decision-making. Mid-
level managers were mostly non-family members, who had worked in the business since its inception. 
The business family tended to rely on these non-family founding employees’ expertise and loyalty after 
the founder’s “retirement”. Nevertheless, frontline employees did not have opportunities to participate 
in decision-making, nor any clue of the decision-making procedures.   
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 At the mature stage, EM still sought community via considerable family and kinship ties. As 
the owner-manager claimed, “Most employees are from this village and we share the same surname… 
we’re naturally one big family.” Informal strong ties were ubiquitous, within and around the business. 
EM’s community remained clannish, insular, and inward-looking, largely based on interpersonal 
interactions.   
 Notwithstanding the business maturation, EM decided to maintain its existing connections with 
external stakeholders including suppliers, clients, and governments. These networks, though important 
as a resource base bolstering competitive advantages, were few in number and narrow in range. 
Personal ties prevailed in the connection processes, with a lack of transparency. As the owner-manager 
stated, “Although retired, my father is still around; this is actually good for the business, as he 
maintains the key relationships… I certainly know them too, but my father has worked with them for 
so many years that it is much easier for him to liaise with them.”  
 
Case Study of ED  
Family Influence and Particularistic Trust  
Similar to EM, the start of ED was fully financed by the founder, who left his SOE position. Family 
support was explicit, underpinning the continuity premise, which was recognised by the founding 
employees who were mostly the founder’s former colleagues at the SOE. These employees, through 
their shared past experience of working with the founder at the SOE, already had adequate 
understanding of the founder’s competence and reliability. Given the family influence on continuity, 
they had stronger trust in the founder’s determination and capability of starting and continuing a 
promising business. The owner-manager commented, “All founding employees were friends of my 
father and the family… they could have chosen to stay [in the SOE], but they chose to risk following 
my father, because they trusted him through many years’ work.”  
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 Also similar to EM, family influence via the command premise was strong at ED, particularly 
at its early stage. For example, soon after the firm’s inception, the founder showed his competence by 
insisting on acquiring a local restaurant and turning it into a staff canteen. Though the management 
team did not like the idea because of the concern about increased operational costs, the acquisition 
provided extra benefit to employees and resulted in their extended particularistic trust in the founder. 
 With regard to family influence via the community premise, ED’s tradition emphasised that 
“the company is virtually a big family”, hence the founder looked after employees’ career and personal 
lives, especially those on key positions. But in terms of decision-making, the founder highlighted the 
importance of involving only those who were closely related to him; as he explained, “it was 
impossible, and unnecessary, to include many in decision-making, which would only prolong the 
process and potentially create conflicts.” 
 Throughout its start and growth, the founder’s connection activities endowed the business with 
membership in the local chamber of commerce, access to regional and national trade fairs, and 
business visits organised and funded by the local government. Most of these connections were built 
through the founder’s past experiences in the SOE and personal networks in the local government. 
Arguably, the employees’ observation of the founder’s ability to maintain and capitalise on these 
experiences and networks contributed to their confidence in the founder’s competence and reliability, 
hence particularistic trust in him as a business leader. 
 
Family Influence and System Trust 
Compared to EM, ED took longer to move into the mature stage. In effect, the business only ripened 
with established customer and supplier networks after 2010, which was roughly 16 years after the start-
up when the founder’s daughter took over the reign from her father. It was then that the business 
family’s influence via the continuity premise became less explicit. After the transfer of ownership, the 
business changed significantly, mainly because “the previous business was declining too badly to turn 
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back”. The owner-manager virtually started a new business with different products and processes from 
her father’s. Her view on continuity focused more on the business side than the family side, “I’d rather 
not label it a family business, although all finances are from my family…”. Comparing with the 
founding generation, the business now had a clearly-defined transparent structure and well-specified 
role responsibilities. Employees perceived the owner-manager and her team primarily as fair and 
capable professionals, besides representatives of the business family. 
 At the mature stage, family influence via the command premise changed. In its workforce, the 
owner-manager was the only one from the business family, and all other positions – management and 
non-management – were taken through a “structured merit-based recruitment procedure”. Also, 
employees were organised into workgroups, which were working units where employees had 
opportunities to discuss and make suggestions on the company’s development. In this way, decision-
making became a “business process” instead of a “personal activity”.  
 As far as the community premise is concerned, ED endeavoured to shape and benefit from a 
caring organisational culture, in which, as the owner-manager described, “everyone is connected with 
his or her colleagues and the business, not only in the manner of employment but also emotionally… 
so that they take coming to work as returning home”. At the mature stage, ED took broader community 
activities. Different from their counterparts at EM, ED’s employees were not personally related, and 
there was hardly any family or kinship clannishness that the business could rely on in its pursuit for 
community. ED thus institutionalised an organisational culture through transparent and fair procedures 
and policies, and this was well embraced by the employees. 
 ED broadened its external connections at the mature stage, mainly oriented by market practices 
instead of personal closeness. Benefiting from the initial connections, the company extended its 
external connections. As the owner-manager pointed out, there was a danger in tying up with a few 
suppliers, thus she would rather “explore” the width of the market. A similar approach was taken to 
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managing its customer relationships. These transparent and systematic practices were appreciated by 
the employees.  
 
Case Study of WD  
Family Influence and Particularistic Trust  
During business creation the family offered tangible resources and spiritual support, because of the 
family influence via the continuity premise. The founding finance was predominantly granted by the 
founder’s mother. The father introduced potential clients to WD, given his role as general manager in a 
car-repairing SOE and the resultant well-knitted social connections. The strong family influence also 
drove the employees to build up collaborative or even pseudo-family relationships. Unlike EM but 
similar to ED, employees at WD were mainly recruited externally. Most of them had little industrial 
knowhow, the founder therefore mentored key subordinates and offered consultation whenever possible. 
Strong personal relationships stemmed from the interaction, and they were further enhanced by the 
founder’s competence and caring nature, which fostered the employees’ particularistic trust.  
 The founder of WD had a strong inclination of command and control. While regarded as a 
benevolent and talented leader, the founder sometimes showed the tough side of her personality. When 
negotiating with the global suppliers for a regional agency agreement, for instance, she commanded 
exclusive dealership at all times. The branch manager commented, “Our founder is shrewd and tough 
in strategies. The exclusive dealership bestows the firm a substantial space… we are confident in the 
firm and our leader”.   
Family influence via the community premise at WD was reflected in the development of 
personal ties at the initial stage. For example, the founder handpicked a marketing professional, and 
sent her to specialised external training, which was expensive for small businesses like WD. In this 
context, training was used as a privileged means to show the founder’s care. Those who received 
training reciprocated with the allegiance to the business with the leader at the helm. 
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 Family influence via the connection premise initially was reflected in the founder’s personal 
networks in the local government. Similar to the other cases, the connections were critical because they 
brought in resources essential for the construction of competitive advantages. WD received assistance 
from local communities, as a consequence of the founder’s connections, including free management 
consultancy, access to associations, trade fairs, and professional institutes, as well as financial support. 
The promising start inspired employees’ trust in their leader. 
 
Family Influence and System Trust 
In 2005, seven years after its initiation, WD became mature with its established organisational structure, 
experienced employees, and crafted industrial networks. At this phase, despite the fact that the business 
was initiated by the family, WD was not hostaged by the continuity of family ownership. The founder 
commenced to encourage equity investment from non-family members, thus the ownership structure of 
WD was unique. In 2018, three ownership regimes coexisted: a) 100% family ownership in two 
franchising shops; b) majority ownership in the headquarters and three franchising shops; and c) no 
family ownership in 13 franchising shops which were owned by the shop managers. In fact, policies on 
new shop launch, marketing, performance appraisal, and staff recruitment had been developed and 
enacted. Staff members liked these policies and rules because of their lucidity and fairness.  
With regard to family influence via the command premise, WD had its own feature. While 
family members were welcomed to join the business and take key positions, non-family members were 
also warmly embraced. A total of 13 shops were owned by long-serving loyal employees. The shops 
were bonded to the head-quarters via contracts, which stipulated that they should source licensed 
products from the head-quarters. In general, the policies and procedures catalysed professionalism and 
system trust. 
Moving into the mature stage, WD institutionalised its influence on the community premise via 
internal policies, intending to create a caring, value-creating and cohesive environment. The business 
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invested in the community construction along two directions. Firstly, benefiting from initial external 
off-the-job training, WD operationalised internal on-the-job training regularly thereafter. All staff 
members were encouraged to participate and this was specified in the company’s policies. Secondly, 
WD devoted itself to nurturing a caring organisational culture via organising business-based social 
gatherings. The founder claimed, “We work in a big family and should treat each other like brothers 
and sisters. All of us are connected, not necessarily through blood relationship, but through teamwork”. 
As such, the business had a chance to build a robust business-employee bond through stipulating 
transparent policies and procedures. In return it reaped the benefit of system trust. 
Highly family-influenced businesses often build up enduring alliances with a small number of 
business partners. They are interested in the depth of connections, not the breadth. Yet, WD at the 
mature stage actively expanded its connections with business partners. It maintained a long list of 
suppliers, whose credibility and reliability were frequently reviewed. A similar procedure was followed 
for its customers. The reviewing and optimising procedure overcame the hurdle of managerial rigid 
mentality, and employees consequently were confident in their leaders.  
 
Cross-case Analysis 
Putting the three cases together, insights can be generated to understand trust in family business leaders. 
It is notable that trust in leader evolved over time in all cases.  Table 3 provides a summary of the main 
findings on family influence and trust in leader from our cases. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Initial Stage 
When founded, due to a constrained reach of resources and capabilities, the businesses commonly 
chose to rely on family resources and ongoing support. A clearly-defined business governance structure 
was not available, and decision-making was heavily dependent on the founders and their families. In 
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our cases, family influence tended to be high on the four decision premises. This drove the family 
business leaders to demonstrate their competent, reliable, open, and caring nature, and they nurtured 
and subsequently reinforced the relationship-based particularistic trust.  
Specifically, high family influence via the continuity premise led to recursive continuity 
communication in our cases, enabling the shared identity and vision among both family and non-family 
employees. The homogenous cognition motivated the leaders to use their competence and caring nature 
to keep these firms not only as family businesses, but also as business families (Lewicki and Bunker 
1996). In addition, the homogenous cognition enabled the founders to be open to their subordinates. In 
all our cases, the founding workforce was notably connected to the leaders, through the kinship ties 
(EM), shared past experiences (ED), and individual mentorship (WD). The emotional bonds were 
strong, and were further strengthened by the founders’ open approach, hence particularistic trust in the 
three case companies prevailed.   
Family influence via the command premise motivates the owner-managers to rely on the 
internal employees, instead of externals, in their decision-making (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Nunez-
Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes 2007). This is more of the case in EM and ED. Though 
externals might possess industrial expertise and knowledge, the leaders concerned whether their 
decision-making power might be hijacked, especially when their own authority in the business was not 
established. Therefore, the owner-managers of our cases formed particularistic groups and relied on 
their capabilities and personal approaches to hold the group tightly.   
Strong family influence via communicatively constructed community premise contributes to a 
closer leader-follower relationship, which encourages leaders to show a competent, reliable, open, and 
caring nature, and employees to “behave as stewards” (Chirico and Bau 2014). In our cases, due to 
strong family influence on the community premise, family and non-family employees were able to 
maintain high-quality relationships (this is more explicit in ED and WD), characterised by respect and 
mutual obligations (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995). Employees in such relationships trusted their leaders 
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and committed to value-producing activities and organisational citizenship behaviour (Mayer and 
Gavin 2005). 
Family influence via the connection premise impels networking. At the early stage, our case 
companies did not own rich or robust connections with external stakeholders. What they held were 
mostly internal information channels, primarily built upon the support from family members, and 
sporadic external channels, such as loose links with professional organisations (Hoffman et al. 2006). 
Under this circumstance, the owner-managers endeavoured, based on their competence, to acquire 
resources and access to tacit knowledge (Lechner, Dowling, and Welpe 2006). The promising start 
inspired employees’ trust in their leaders.    
 
Mature Stage 
As businesses grew into the mature stage (about seven years for WD, 16 years for ED, and ten years for 
EM), they were in need of a wider span of resources and capabilities. Sole reliance on the business 
family for these resources and capabilities became difficult. Overall, the intensity of family influence 
decreased from the initial stage, but varied among cases. In particular, WD developed a relatively 
explicit management system, which incorporated the business family’s core values but placed 
considerable emphasis on the formal business system. As a consequence, the foci of communication 
within the business shifted away from the attributes of the leader to the nature of the system. ED 
experienced a similar change at the mature stage. After the generational succession, family influence 
remained on all decision premises, but less intensively compared with the initial stage, partly because 
of the development of policies and procedures that translated family values into business values. EM 
stayed behind the other two companies in its evolution of trust in leader. It continued to have strong 
family influence in its second generation. Almost all practices initiated by its founding generation 
continued, and employees were personally connected in general. Particularistic trust that was 
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communicatively constructed based on the leader’s nature still prevailed, with vague indications of 
system trust.  
When continuity is emphasised, executive leaders often encourage family members to join the 
firm, or take senior positions irrespective of their competency, as we can see from EM. Though what 
occurred in EM seemed to have addressed the company’s continuity concern, this staffing approach 
had a negative impact on the employees’ system trust. ED and WD took a different approach. Instead 
of bringing in family members to satisfy the continuity concern, they committed to the system 
development. The communication therefore recursively occurred on the nature of the system. 
Institution-based trust emerged as a result of this communication, albeit the extent of trust differing in 
the two companies.     
Family influence via the command premise motivates owner-managers to use their own people 
in decision-making (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007), rather than building up transparent and fair procedures 
and policies. Such impetus may cause confrontations, as non-family members perceive it as resistance 
against their upward mobility (Morris, Williams, Allen, and Avila 1997). In EM, high family influence 
hindered the development of system trust, where employees were mostly indifferent about the 
company’s strategic vision. In ED and WD, with the development and implementation of transparent 
and fair policies and procedures, employee involvement increased, enabling a motivated and unified 
workforce, as well as system trust. 
At the mature stage, strong family influence via the community premise can trigger the 
employees’ suspicion about the transparency and fairness at workplace. This will demotivate their 
involvement in, and contribution to, the business (Gould-Williams 2003). Moreover, leaders in highly 
family-influenced businesses often enjoy their personal prestige via the community (Berrone, Cruz, 
Gómez-Mejía, and Larraza 2010). They may choose to defer the development of institutional policies 
and procedures to avoid loss of their status (Konig et al. 2013). The strong family influence on 
community is evident in the case of EM, where, for example, an implicit but important principle of 
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recruitment was family relatedness. In contrast, ED and WD had introduced more market-oriented 
recruitment processes. This resulted in more diverse workforces, and more communication in relation 
to the business system.   
Last but not least, strong family influence via the connection premise prompts businesses to 
network for the depth, rather than breadth, of external resources (Classen, Van Gils, Bammens, and 
Carree 2012).  Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) recognised that highly family-influenced businesses 
often have long-standing relationships with a small number of external stakeholders. But continued 
reliance on a narrow range of external stakeholders does not lead to transparency in connection, and 
can further result in managerial “tunnel vision” (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990), or a rigid mentality 
(Konig et al. 2013). The leader’s narrow and rigid mindset often undermines employees’ confidence in 
the business, as evidenced in the worry of EM’s R&D team leader about the company’s implicit and 
sole reliance on the local government funding for its product development projects. ED and WD, on the 
other hand, were able to access external resources via a more transparent approach and from a wider 
range.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Trust is a critical source of competitive advantage for family businesses (Steier 2001). However, 
current knowledge of trust in the literature is primarily related to non-family businesses, whereas trust 
in family businesses to an extent is overlooked, albeit these businesses being the most common 
economic organisations world-wide. Our study attempts to examine trust in family businesses and we 
endeavour to make contributions to the family business literature.  
Specifically, our study builds on the work of Sundaramurthy (2008), Tan et al. (2009), Shi et al. 
(2015), as well as Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) and Frank et al. (2017), to seek insights into the 
emergence and evolution of trust in family business leaders, and more importantly the impact of family 
influence on trust in leader. To do so, we adopt a dynamic perspective. We argue that trust in leader 
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varies across the business life cycle and tends to demonstrate distinct features at different phases. We 
investigate the impact of family influence on trust in leader from the nST, rather than the traditional 
resource-based, social capital, or network perspective. We contend that business families can influence 
business decisions via decision premises, and that different decision premises exist for particularistic 
and system trust. This way, we reduce the complexity in understanding family influence, trust, as well 
as their nexus, as the nST offers a clear theoretical lens to examine business issues.   
Our first finding shows that different types of trust exists in family businesses, and that trust in 
leader evolves, though the pace of evolution varies. In the literature, when trust is examined, 
researchers usually take on board a static perspective. This has been evidenced in an array of studies in 
the literature on trust in leader, its antecedents as well as the behaviour and performance outcomes 
(Dirks and Ferrin 2002; Burke et al. 2007). Nevertheless, given the dynamically changing environment, 
using a dynamic perspective to scrutinise trust in businesses is arguably more appropriate. The outcome 
of our study confirms this viewpoint, hence a non-trivial finding. Moreover, in the limited family 
business trust literature, Morris, Allen, Kurakto and Brannon (2010) and Pearson and Marler (2010) 
look into family business leaders’ imprints on trust (cf., Eddleston et al. 2010). Morris et al. (2010) 
found that the family can be a source of support, facilitating the founder in creating a business venture. 
This support may lead to the founder’s positive emotions, and he/she will then build up trusting 
relationships with subordinates. Pearson and Marler (2010) found that family business leaders who are 
able to create good relationships with family and non-family employees can nurture stewardship in the 
business. Our study resonates with Pearson and Marler (2010) and Morris et al. (2010) and goes 
further, since we take into account the influence of the entire business families including the owner-
managers. We observe that one of the key functions the business family has is to establish decision 
premises in the business through communication and exert its influence via the premises. The presence 
of these decision premises ensures the alignment of business decisions with a set of family values and 
practices, therefore, even when the family is not present, family influence continues (Suess-Reyes 
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2017). More importantly, our results reveal that the heightened family influence via family-induced 
decision premises exerts positive impact on particularistic trust at the business initial stage but negative 
effect on system trust at the mature stage. This finding is original, while the nexus between family 
influence and trust has implications on business practical operations.   
 
Contributions  
The study adopts the nST, which is a theoretical framework that has recently been applied to family 
business research (e.g., Von Schlippe and Frank 2013; Frank et al. 2017; Hasenzagl et al. 2018). In 
particular, we concentrate on decision premises (Simon 1957) for family influence, particularistic trust, 
and system trust. By doing so, we enable the examination of a potentially complicated research 
problem, that is, the impact of family influence on trust in leader. Our finding represents a contribution, 
which suggests that a nexus exists between family influence and trust in leader. Meanwhile, our 
research extends the application of the nST in the family business domain and leaves a noteworthy 
footprint in the territory. Secondly, trust may vary according to time and business context (Steier 2001).  
Our study focuses on trust evolution along the time horizon. Our findings endorse Sundaramurthy’s 
(2008) viewpoint with empirical evidence, and show the necessity of using the dynamic perspective in 
the trust research. Finally, trust and its evolution in family businesses are shaped by the idiosyncratic 
institutional environment, as well as dictated by historical, cultural, and even geographical traditions. 
This study is executed in China, a transitional economy with family businesses emerging after 1979 
and flourishing since the 1990s. Due to the underdeveloped state of formal institutions, family 
businesses, compared with their state-owned and collective-owned counterparts, receive a low level of 
legal and institutional protection (Tan 2002). Trust hence plays an important role in business 
operations, since maintaining trust at a high level, irrespective of relationship-based particularistic trust 
or institution-based system trust, may offset the negative bearing caused by the underdeveloped formal 
institutions. The study uniquely juxtaposes insights from multiple angles including Chinese socio-
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economic-cultural context, trust in leader, and family influence. Research findings advance our 
understanding on how family businesses in China are able to survive, evolve, and thrive.  
 
Managerial Implications   
Frank and Landstrom (2015) pointed out that the institutionalisation of entrepreneurship research often 
favours rigour over relevance of research, resulting in a rigour-relevance gap. They suggested that 
researchers focus on the creation of applicative knowledge rather than rigour of research exclusively. 
As such, we attempt the knowledge arising from the study that can be practically applicable. Herein we 
highlight three inter-related implications. Firstly, the literature suggests that family businesses are a 
fertile ground for both trust and distrust. Trust can facilitate knowledge creation (Lin 2001), channel 
the employees’ momentum towards the same direction, and ease business governance (Eddleston et al. 
2010). Trust in essence is “a fundamental basis for cooperation” (Steier, 2001, p.354). When trust 
exists, an "escalating" operational process can be expected. Nevertheless, trust is fragile and can easily 
be destroyed (Sundaramurphy, 2008). Distrust may cause dysfunctional relationships, business 
complexity, and paralysis of actions (Pearson, Carr, and Shaw 2008). It is therefore legitimate to 
suggest that family business leaders consider nurturing a trust and stewardship culture in their 
firms. Particularly, a trust fostering and developing charter can be taken into account, which covers for 
instance the importance of family business engaging in the trust construction, the role of family and 
non-family members in this process, the mechanisms and procedures to address trust-related conflicts, 
and the reviewing process for continued trust development.    
Secondly, the study finds relationship-based particularistic trust is particularly valuable initially. 
As businesses mature, a barrier against business development is that executive leaders continuously 
rely on relationship-based trust and ignore the necessity of developing institution-based system trust. 
The EM’s case is in this vein. Thus we suggest that executive leaders take into account the evolutionary 
30 
 
nature of trust. In fact, not only does trust show an evolutionary nature, the decision premises for trust 
evolve as well. The study reveals the decision premises of particularistic and system trust differ, with 
the former signified by the leader’s personal nature and the latter by the attributes of the business 
system. March and Simon (1958) in their landmark book “Organizations” indicated that organisations, 
whenever possible, seek to reduce uncertainty. They further argued that decision premises can serve as 
a mechanism of uncertainty absorption, since the premises set up expectations as to what information is 
required for decision, channel the information flow, and alert to the organisation when a risky signal is 
received (Perrow, 1986). Given the importance of decision premises, particularly their relationship with 
trust in this study’s context, entrepreneurs should pay attention to their function and review their role 
regularly.   
 Thirdly, the study shows that a high level of family influence can be translated into a high level 
of particularistic trust, but a diminished level of system trust. This implies that the holding families 
should be cautious about their influence, if the firm’s long-term prosperity is concerned, and be vigilant 
whether their influence inspires confidence, engagement, and loyalty from their subordinates. 
Specifically, at the initial stage family firms should heighten their influence via the decision premises. 
At the mature stage, firms should strategically tone down their family influence and facilitate the 
erection of organisational policies and procedures on governance and business development.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is not short of limitations, one of which is related to the research environment. In China, 
businesses overall are not familiar with empirical research or data collection approaches such as 
interviews and questionnaire surveys. This was manifested that some interviewees did not feel 
comfortable in the interviews. Information garnered therefore may not portray the picture to a robust 
extent. Secondly, family business as a business entity is relatively new in China. Due to the ideological 
concern and the fact that China had been in a planned economy for long, family businesses often 
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struggle with the family icon, especially in communication. Though the three companies involved 
accepted our research invitation, the extent of revelation of family related issues was uncertain. 
Thirdly, Ralston, Yu, Wang, Terpstra, Gustafson, and Wei (1996) recognised wide-ranging variations 
among managers from different regions of China. Whilst regional culture may have an impact on 
managers, the level of regional economy also shapes business operations. The three participating 
companies in the current study are from two regions, Jiangsu and Xinjiang respectively, which only 
capture limited indigenous features of China and consequently limit the generalisability of the study. 
Finally, the study is executed in China, a transitional economy with rich social, historical, and 
geographical contexts of trust. The research setting, while offering a convincing venue for examining 
family business and trust, suggests the study has limited generalisability, since the evolution and the 
dynamic nature of trust in leader in family businesses are deeply rooted in the specific institutional 
environment.  
 
Directions for Future Research  
Following this empirical work, several directions for future research can be envisaged. Firstly, as the 
topic has only been qualitatively examined, it needs validation through quantitative studies. To 
empirically test the relationships reported by the current study, researchers need to develop reliable and 
valid measurements to measure constructs reflected in this study, including family influence over the 
continuity, command, community, and connection premises, particularistic trust, and system trust. 
These measurements form the foundation for the quantitative study. Future studies could also delve 
into the intervening effects of individual, organisational, and industrial variables, while testing the 
nexus between family influence and trust. The literature shows that the repertoire of skills of the 
entrepreneur (Lee and Venkataraman 2006), the age and history of the business, and the characteristics 
of the industry may influence trust in leader (Tan et al. 2009). Via incorporating individual, 
organisational, and industrial variables, more comprehensive understanding of antecedents to 
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particularistic and system trust can be achieved. Finally, if we move one step further to stretch the 
research boundary to incorporate non-family businesses, the impact of variables on particularistic and 
system trust at different levels can be revisited. Such empirical comparison may enable researchers to 
develop more incisive understanding of trust in leader.  
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i
In China, the definition of SMEs, according to the SME Promotion Law of China (2003), depends on 
the industry category and is based on the company’s number of employees, registered assets, and 




Industry Number of 
employees 
Registered assets Annual revenue 
Small Manufacturing < 300 < ¥ 40m < ¥ 30m 
 Construction < 600 < ¥ 40m < ¥ 30m 
 Wholesale < 100 < ¥ 40m < ¥ 30m 
 Retail < 100 < ¥ 40m < ¥ 10m 
Medium Manufacturing 300 – 2000 ¥ 40m - 400m ¥ 30m - 300m 
 Construction 600 – 3000 ¥ 40m - 400m ¥ 30m - 300m 
 Wholesale 100 – 200 ¥ 40m - 400m ¥ 30m - 300m 
 Retail 100 – 500 ¥ 40m - 400m ¥ 10m - 150m 





Table 1 Case Company Profile 






Generation Owned by 
EM Jiangsu 1990 Vehicle parts 
manufacturing 
¥10m ¥30m 70 Second Founder’s son 
ED Jiangsu 1994 Vehicle sales and 
service 
¥20m ¥120m 120 Second Founder’s 
daughter 
WD Xinjiang 1998 Vehicle parts 
sales and service 





Table 2 Profile of Interviewees 























Shop manager   ---- 
 
Table 3 Family Influence and Trust in Leader 









Continuity  Strong family influence via the 
continuity premise - the start-up was fully 
financed by the founder, who was a well-
paid public servant in the local government 
previously. 
 The founder’s wife quitted her job 
in an SOE, and devoted full-time to the 
start-up’s external networking and client 
relationship management.  
 All employees were local 
residents; many were distant relatives of the 
founder. 
 “It was commonly acknowledged 
that the business’s survival and growth was 
in everyone’s personal interest… and as a 
big family [clan], everyone did justice to the 
business [continuity]” – the current owner-
manager. 
 
 High level of particularistic trust – 
particularistic trust in leader stemmed from 
the competence of the leader in organising 
resources and the close relationships 
between the founder and employees. 
 Strong family influence via the 
continuity premise - the founder mentored and 
assisted his son for nearly ten years before 
succession. After succession, the business 
model did not really change, and key positions 
were either taken by the owner’s family 
(brother as deputy manager, wife as book-
keeper) or founding employees, who 
maintained personal ties with the owning 
family, and particularly the retired founder.  
 
 Low level of system trust – 
development of policies and procedures was 
started by the second generation. These 
policies and procedures were still pre-mature. 
“Personally, I am his [owner-manager’s] 
distant relative, but this was not how I came to 
work here. After all, business is business… I 
don’t think having too much family 




        Command  Strong family influence via the 
command premise - the founder had low 
tolerance of employees’ incapability. For 
instance, he fired a distant relative who 
repeatedly made careless and serious 
mistakes. 
 
 High level of particularistic trust – 
the incident left the founder with an image 
of power and might, which was welcomed 
by the employees. As the office 
administrator recalled, “Most of the time, he 
(the founder) tended to be flexible and easy-
going, but he was sharp and firm with the 
bottom lines … he fired his cousin and 
made the case known to everyone… we 
thought he was a trustable boss.” 
 Strong family influence via the 
command premise - the strong command 
nature continued after succession. 
 All key positions were taken by the 
owner’s family members. The founder was 
still frequently consulted for strategic 
decision-making. Mid-level managers were 
mostly long-serving employees. After the 
“retirement” of the founder, the owning 
family tended to rely on these non-family 
founding employees to manage and grow the 
business. 
 
 Low level of system trust –frontline 
employees did not really take part in the 
business’s decision-making. No transparent 
procedure was available. “After all, it is their 
family’s business…”, the machine operator 
reflected. 
        Community  Strong family influence via the 
community premise – EM kept a core 
management team that included only the 
owning family members, delivering a high 
level of consistency in decision making and 
implementation of the business.   
 
 High level of particularistic trust – 
employees perceived the core decision-
making team as providing consistency in 
business strategies, hence the leader’s 
reliability was established. The office 
administrator reflected, “We are all part of 
the village, and they [the owning family] 
know us well… we [employees] don’t have 
to worry about decisions, since they 
certainly know what they are doing.” 
 Strong family influence via the 
community premise – EM sought community 
with considerable family or kinship ties. 
 “Most employees are from this 
village and we bear the same surname… we’re 
naturally one big family”, the incumbent 
owner-manager claimed. His brother/deputy 
manager added, “Many of them [employees] 
are actually my distant relatives, some are my 
seniors…” 
 
 Low level of system trust – No clear 
sign that system trust was established.  
        Connection  Strong family influence via the 
connection premise - initial connections 
were based on the founder’s personal 
networks in the local government. 
 These connections helped EM to 
participate in major regional trade fairs, 
which facilitated its market access and 
customer relationships. 
 
 High level of particularistic trust - 
Given the key role that these connections 
played in the firm’s performance, they were 
highly regarded not only by the 
management, but also the employees, who 
reckoned the business as secure and stable 
because of the founder’s competence. 
 Strong family influence via the 
connection premise – long lasting connections 
were critical for EM because these 
stakeholders provided resources which helped 
EM to develop strategic capabilities and 
competitive advantages. 
 Personal ties and networks prevailed. 
Many connections were still based on the 
founder’s former colleagues.  
 The R&D team leader reflected, “My 
team relies on the government grants… our 
ongoing receipt of them, as we all know, is 
very much dependant on the tie between his 
(the owner-manager’s) father and the local 
government.” 
 
 Low level of system trust - No clear 





Continuity  Strong family influence via the 
continuity premise – start-up fully financed 
by the founder, who was a senior manager 
in a local SOE previously. 
 Mild family influence via the 
continuity premise – after the succession, the 
second-generation owner-manager virtually 








 The founder’s brother worked in 
the business initially to oversee the 
production and then in charge of marketing. 
 Founding employees were mostly 
the founder’s former colleagues in the SOE.  
 
 High level of particularistic trust – 
“Most of them [founding employees] had 
spent numerous years with me in the SOE, 
and they chose to continue with me when I 
decided to start my own business… they 
were important assets to the business, 
especially at the beginning”, the founder 
recalled. The current owner-manager further 
added, “The founding employees were 
friends of my father and the family… they 
could have chosen to stay [in the SOE] ….”. 
and processes. No other members from the 
family were formally employed. 
 The incumbent owner-manager’s 
view on business continuity focused more on 
the business side than the family side, “I’d 
rather not label it a family business… it 
matters more if the business keeps growing 
and prospering.”  
 
 High level of system trust – ED now 
had a clearly-defined transparent structure 
and position responsibilities. “[ED is] the one 
that is least like a family business, [because] 
the firm is so structured that everyone 
understands his or her responsibilities 
associated with the position… and you don’t 
have the family boss instructing you at all 
times” – the line manager stated. 
        Command  Strong family influence via the 
command premise – the founder had 
exclusive power in decision making, which 
can be reflected in an early incident that he 
insisted acquiring a local restaurant and 
turned it into a staff canteen. 
 
 High level of particularistic trust - 
the acquisition of the restaurant resulted in 
extended particularistic trust in the leader 
because of his competence. As the founder 
reflected, “My management team didn’t like 
my idea (about the staff canteen) … because 
it would incur extra costs, and it truly did, 
but I thought it was good for the employees; 
they are the business, not just me or my own 
family… they (the employees) liked me 
better, I believe.” 
 Weak family influence via the 
command premise – after succession, the 
owner-manager was the only one from the 
owning family, and all other management 
positions were taken by personnel recruited 
from the job market, through a “structured 
merit-based recruitment procedure”. The 
founder was no longer involved in business, 
because the business had significantly 
changed. 
 
 High level of system trust – ED now 
had a clearly-defined hierarchical and 
transparent management structure. Besides, 
employees had opportunities to discuss and 
make suggestions on the business’s 
development.  
 Community  Strong family influence via the 
community premise – the founder took the 
responsibility to look after employees’ 
career and personal lives. This was enacted 
through organisational events and social 
gatherings. 
 The founder highlighted the 
importance of involving only those who 
were closely related to him.  
 
 High level of particularistic trust - 
organisational events and social gathering 
motivated a sense of belonging of 
employees. Particularistic trust in the leader 
was nurtured due to his care of employees. 
 Weak family influence via the 
community premise – ED currently 
institutionalised its pursuit for community by 
internal policies and practices.  
 Workgroups were established, where 
employees gathered for both work-related and 
social networking.  
 It was written in the company’s 
charter that employees’ voices should be 
sought and considered in decision making. 
 
 High level of system trust – the 
business institutionalised an organisational 
culture through formal procedures and internal 
policies. This practice was seen as transparent 
and fair by its employees. 
 Connection  Strong family influence via the 
connection premise – the founder had good 
connections with the local government or 
agencies. 
 These connection activities 
endowed the business with membership in 
 Weak family influence via the 
connection premise – external connections 
were wider and numerous, oriented by market 
practices rather than personal closeness. 
 In exploring connections with 
suppliers, ED continuously attempted and 
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the local chamber of commerce, accesses to 
regional and national trade fairs, and visits 
organised and funded by the local 
government. 
 
 High level of particularistic trust – 
the strong connections were perceived as 
critical for the survival and development of 
the business, on which the employees relied. 
sifted out reliable partners. Customer 
information was recorded and updated, and 
interactions with these partners were reviewed 
on a regular basis. 
 
 High level of system trust –ED’s 
connection activities were open to, and widely 










Continuity  Strong family influence via the 
continuity premise - the founder’s mother 
financed the start-up. The founder’s father 
brought in clients and introduced the start-
up to industrial fairs and professional 
conferences. 
 The founder vigorously fostered 
collaboration within the business and laid 
down rules of mutual support, encouraging 
collaboration among employees.  
 
 High level of particularistic trust - 
the chief accountant reflected, “I am the 
employee with the longest service record 
with WD. She [the founder] mentored so 
many of us, especially at the initial stage, 
based on her expertise in accounting and 
knowledge of this industry; we feel grateful 
and admire her as a trustworthy and gifted 
leader”. 
 Mild family influence via the 
continuity premise – the founder explained 
the rationale, “We pay attention to business 
continuity, not necessarily the continuity of 
family ownership. We welcome non-family 
members holding shops… When they stand 
up for new shops, it signals that they are 
confident in their capabilities and are willing 
to take responsibilities”. 
 
 High level of system trust – 
transparent and fair policies on new shop 
launch, marketing, performance appraisal, and 
staff recruitment were developed. The 
founder’s sister commented, “Operations in 
the company became complicated after the 
first few years and deserved well thought-
through policies and rules. Our governing 
logic therefore changed. My sister [the 
founder] and the senior management team 
have done a good job and worked out policies 
and rules tailored to this business”. 
 Command  Strong family influence via the 
command premise - the founder always 
commanded exclusive dealership from 
suppliers, and never compromised on her 
stance in business negotiations.  
 
 High level of particularistic trust - 
the exclusive dealership enabled the firm to 
achieve competitive advantage over other 
regional competitors. Employees were 
confident in their leader’s competence and 
the firm.  
 Weak family influence via the 
command premise - non-family members were 
welcomed to join the business and take 
administrative roles. Long-serving loyal 
employees were encouraged to launch new 
shops. The non-family shop manager 
reflected, “While following the general 
directions from headquarters and sticking to 
the general corporate strategy, we have a final 
say in our own branches”. 
 
 High level of system trust - the senior 
management team was mainly composed of 
non-family members. Executive meetings 
were held regularly every week. The chief 
account stated “… We openly discuss issues 
in relation to resource acquisition and 
distribution, branch monitoring, and new 
opportunities in the market”.  
 Community  Strong family influence via the 
community premise - WD pursued 
community through personal ties at the 
initial stage. The training delivered by 
industry specialists was available only to 
selected employees. Training was used as a 
 Weak family influence via the 
community premise – WD institutionalised its 
community pursuit via internal policies and 
practices, where the aim was to create a 




means to build up personal relationships 
with key staff members.   
 
 High level of particularistic trust – 
external off-the-job training was expensive 
for s small business. As a result, training 
meant privilege, as well as the care of the 
founder. Those who received training 
showed allegiance to the firm with the 
leader at the helm. 
 Benefiting from the initial external 
training, WD operationalised internal on-the-
job training thereafter, which was offered to 
all staff members.  
 WD organised business-based social 
gatherings to build up its community.  
 
 High level of system trust – building 
up a business-employee bond through 
stipulating transparent policies and procedures 
helps the firm reap the benefit of trust. The 
chief accountant commented, “WD has well-
designed policies and procedures, looking 
after our staff members’ health, wellbeing and 
career development…”. The branch manager 
added, “We learn significantly from the 
training events. We turn out to be proficient 
though we know little at the starting point... ”. 
        Connection  Strong family influence via the 
connection premise – With the help from 
the family, the founder connected with local 
governments and communities at the start-
up. The benefits the company harvested 
included free management consultancy, 
access to commercialised associations, as 
well as financial support. 
 
 High level of particularistic trust - 
the leader’s competence inspired staff’s 
trust. Most of them felt secure with the 
business and believed the firm’s potential in 
creating assets for people involved.  
 Weak family influence via the 
connection premise - WD had extensive 
external connections with the help from 
various stakeholders linked to the business. 
The credibility and reliability of the 
suppliers/customers were reviewed on a 
regular basis.    
 
 High level of system trust - the 
founder commented, “We have connections 
across Xinjiang and many other provinces. For 
our customers and suppliers, we have internal 
reviewing and validating schemes … This is 
the common knowledge of our staff members. 
They hold strong belief in the system and of 
course the leader, since they have tangible 
feelings of what is going on”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
